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Abstract
The paper develops an international macroeconomic model of FDI ﬂows with a unique feature: a
hands-on management ability to react in real time to changing economic environments. Anticipating
this advantage, foreign direct investors can outbid other investors in a certain industry in which they
specialize in the source country. The model can explain both two-way FDI ﬂows among developed
countries and one-way FDI ﬂows from developed to developing country. The unique gains from FDI
to the host country stem from the increased eﬃciency of domestic investment.
JEL.Nos. F2. F3.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In perfect capital markets (with full information) all forms of capital ﬂows (FDI, debt and portfolio
equity) are indistinguishable. In the presence of incomplete information, these ﬂows are diﬀerent from
one another.1 For instance, ﬁrm mnagement with portfolio investment might be plagued by a “free-
rider" problem. As noted succintly by Oliver Hart (2000), “if the shareholder does something to improve
∗The authors are grateful to Philip Lane and Morten Raven for helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft
and to the European Commission for ﬁnancial support for the RTN project, "Analysis of International Capital Markets:
Understanding Europe’s Role in the Global Economy."
†Mario Henrique Simonsen Professor of Public Economics, Tel-Aviv University and Friedman Professor of International
Economics, Cornell University, razin@post.tau.ac.il; fax: 972-3-6409908.
‡Henry Kaufman Professor of International Capital Markets, Tel-Aviv University, sadka@post.tau.ac.il; fax: 972-3-
6409908.
1Other models that attempt to distinguish among capital ﬂows [e.g., Gordon and Bovenberg (1996), Razin, Sadka and
Yuen (1998, 1999)] assumed segmented markets both across FDI, debt and portfolio equity and across countries. In these
models there is an information asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors, which leads to a home bias in portfolio
equity investment. An interesting empirical study of these asymmetry and bias is provided in Portes and Rey (1999).
1the quality of management, then the beneﬁts will be enjoyed by all shareholders. Unless the shareholder
is altruistic, she will ignore this beneﬁcial impact on other shareholders and so will under-invest in the
activity of monitoring or improving management."
We view FDI as having a unique characteristic with respect to the quality of management. Foreign
direct investors, by deﬁnition, acquire some signiﬁcant control over the ﬁrm they invest in. They can
then apply hands-on management (micro-management) standards that enable them to react in real
time to changing economic environments.They can obtain the full beneﬁts of their actions of monitoring
the ﬁrm for themselves because they gain control over the ﬁrm, and thereby mitigating the free-rider
problem. This feature may stem from a specialization by the foreign direct investors in a certain niche.2
This could explain both two-way ﬂows of FDI among developed economies, and one-way ﬂows from
developed to developing economies.
In this paper we explore the implications of this unique feature of FDI for the eﬃciency of domestic
investment and the gains from FDI inﬂows. The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2
develops a model of FDI ﬂows with incomplete information and micro-management of FDI-controlled
ﬁrms. In Section 3 we describe the equilibrium in the absence of FDI. Section 4 discusses the gains from
FDI trade. Section 5 concludes.
2F r e e F l o w o f F D I
Suppose there is a very large number (N) of ex-ante identical domestic ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm employs capital
input (K) in the ﬁrst period, in order to produce a single composite good in the second period. We
assume that capital depreciates at the rate δ(< 1). Output in the second period is equal to F(K)(1+ε),
where F(·) is a production function exhibiting diminishing marginal productivity of capital and ε is a
random productivity factor. The latter has zero mean and is independent across all ﬁrms. Naturally, ε
is bounded below by −1, so that output is always non-negative; and for notation ease we also assume
that ε is bounded from above by 1.S u p p o s et h a tε is purely idiosyncratic, so that there is no aggregate
uncertainty. Consumer-investors are well diversiﬁed and will thus behave in a risk-neutral way. We
denote by G(·) the cumulative distribution function of ε and by g(·)=G0(·) the corresponding density
function.
At the starting point of the decision process of agents in the ﬁrst period, the random productivity
factor (ε) is revealed to no-one. Each ﬁr mi se n d o w e dw i t ha ni n i t i a ls t o c ko fc a p i t a lK0. In order to
2See Gopinath (2001) for an interesting application of a search model for a study of FDI ﬂo w st od e v e l o p i n ge c o n o m i e s .
2invest and augment this stock of capital the ﬁrm must incur ﬁrst a ﬁxed setup cost of C. Because the
ﬁrms are all ex-ante (that is, in the ﬁrst period, when investments are made) identical, they all choose
t h es a m ei n v e s t m e n t ,KF
1 − (1 − δ)K0 to augment their capital stock to KF
1 . The investment decision
i sb a s e do nt h ea v e r a g ev a l u eo fε (which is zero) according to the ﬁrst-order marginal productivity
condition:
F0[KF
1 )=δ + rF, (1)
where rF is the exogenously given world rate of interest. Because the ﬁrm has also the alternative of
not investing at all and avoiding the setup cost, then it will indeed invest and augment its capital stock
to KF
1 , if and only if:
F(KF
1 )+( 1− δ)KF
1
1+rF − [KF
1 − (1 − δ)K0 − C] (2)
=
{F[(1 − δ)K0]+( 1− δ)2K0}
1+rF .
The left-hand-side of (2) is equal to cash ﬂow (in present value) with new investment, whereas the
right-hand-side is equal to the corresponding cash ﬂow with no new investment. We assume that this
c o n d i t i o ni n d e e dh o l d ss ot h a ta l lﬁrms would have indeed invested KF
1 −(1−δ)K0 ,if this were all the
information available at this stage.
Now, suppose that at this stage (before ε is revealed) foreign direct investors step in and bring
with them their superior micro-management skills. Speciﬁcally, we assume that an FDI investor, once
acquiring and managing a ﬁrm, can better monitor the productivity of the ﬁrm (before investment in
physical capital is carried out) than her domestic counterpart. To simplify things, assume that the FDI
investor can actually elicit the true ε of the ﬁrm, after she acquires control of the ﬁrm, but before she
has to carry out the investment plan. She can thus ﬁne tune the level of the capital stock to the true ε.
Put diﬀerently, the FDI investor will carry out an ε−dependent schedule, KF
1 (ε) which is determined








= rF + δ. (3)
Naturally, the ﬁrm will actually carry out this investment plan only if it is preferable to not investing
3at all. Therefore, there exists a cutoﬀ level of the productivity factor, denoted by εF
0 , such that the
ﬁrm will indeed augment its capital stock to ˆ KF
1 (ε), if its productivity factor is above this threshold;
otherwise the ﬁrm will make no new investment and operate do with its initial stock of capital [namely,






(1 − δ)K0 if ε 5 εF
0
ˆ KF
1 (ε) if ε = εF
0
. (4)
The cutoﬀ level εF
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F[(1 − δ)K0]+( 1− δ)2K0
1+rF .
Anticipating this ﬁne-tuned investment schedule, the value to a potential FDI investor of a domestic



















0 if ε < εF
0
1 if ε ≥ εF
0
. (7)
The initial domestic owner, if she does not sell the ﬁrm, will carry out the same (ε−independent)
investment [namely, KF
1 −(1−δ)K0] f o ra l lt h e( e x - a n t ei d e n t i c a l )ﬁrms. Therefore the reservation price




1 )+( 1− δ)KF
1
1+rF − [KF
1 − (1 − δ)K0 − C]. (8)
Note that the value of a ﬁrm to an FDI investor (namely, V ), which is generated by a ﬁne-tuned
investment schedule, KF
1 (ε), will be higher than the reservation price of the domestic owner (namely,
4RF). Therefore, FDI investors will outbid domestic investors for all the ﬁrms in this industry. Because
we assume that there is an inﬁnitely elastic supply of foreign direct investors faced by our small open
economy, then competition among these investors will drive the price up to V, thereby generating a pure
rent of V − RF to the initial owners of each of the ﬁxed number of the domestic ﬁrms.
To complete the description of the equilibrium, denote the aggregate output available in the ﬁrst
period for consumption and investment by F(K0). Then the consolidated (present-value) resource con-





1+rF = F(K0)+V, (9)
where CF
i is consumption in period i =1 ,2. (For notational ease we ignore all other industries in this






where u(·) is the representative utility function and where ui(·),i=1 ,2, stands for a partial derivative.
3A b s e n c e o f F D I F l o w s
In order to assess the gains from FDI (to be discussed in the next section), we must consider an
equilibrium where FDI is absent. To save on words, we refer to this equilibrium as an autarky. Denoting
the equilibrium interest rate by RA, we implicitly deﬁne the equilibrium stock of capital, KA
1 , by:
F0(KA
1 )=rA + δ (11)
We assume that:
F(KA
1 )+( 1− δ)KA
1
1+rA − [KA
1 +( 1− δ)KA
1 − C] ≥
F[(1 − δ)K0]+( 1− δ)2K0
1+rA , (12)
so that it is indeed worthwhile to augment the capital stock of all the ex-ante identical ﬁrms to KA
1 .
The period-by-period resource constraints, that must hold at autarky, are given by:
CA
1 +[ KA




1 )+( 1− δ)KA
1 , (14)







i is the consumption in period i =1 ,2 at autarky.
4G a i n s f r o m F D I
The ex-ante (expected) gains from FDI are in line with the traditional trade proposition: They accrue
entirely to the domestic, small economy. (Recall that the FDI investors pay a price V for all domestic
ﬁrms which captures all the beneﬁts from the superior FDI management skills, thus leaving the FDI
investors with a return just equalling the world rate of interest.) We can classify these gains into
two categories. First, there are the conventional gains that stem from opening up the economy to
the ﬂow of capital, thereby allowing a more eﬃcient intertemporal allocation of consumption (usually
via consumption smoothing) and investment. Second, there are the intrinsic gains associated with the
superior micro-management by FDI investors. These gains stem from a ﬁne-tuned capital stock, KF
1 (·)
brought about by FDI investors, as opposed to a uniform (over all ﬁrms) capital stock, KF
1 , which
domestic investors would have chosen in the absence of FDI. This advantage gives rise to a value of
V for a domestic ﬁrm to an FDI investor, which is higher than the value of the ﬁrm (namely, the
reservation price RF) in the absence of FDI. But this gap (namely, V − RF) is entirely captured by
the domestic economy, because of perfect competition among FDI investors for the ﬁx e dn u m b e ro ft h e
domestic ﬁrms. These ﬁne-tuning gains are represented by:




1 (ε)] − F(KF
1 )}(1 + ε) − (rF + δ)[KF




These ﬁne-tuning gains consist of: (i) the expected present value of the additional beneﬁts from
having a capital stock of KF
1 (ε) instead of KF
1 ,when the productivity factor is ε; 3 and (ii) the saving
of the “sunk" cost C in all the low-productivity ﬁrms [whose number is G(εF
0 )].
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65C o n c l u s i o n
The model presented here is extended in Razin and Sadka (2002) to include a screening (or search)
technology that at some ﬁxed cost per ﬁrm can elicit the true value of the productivity factor of the
ﬁrm, ε. A potential buyer can apply the technology after she acquires and gains control of the
ﬁrm. We assume that foreign direct investors have a cutting-edge advantage over domestic investors in
extracting information about the true value of the ﬁrm. If they acquire a domestic ﬁrm, they can apply
their superior micro-management skills in order to elicit the true value of the productivity factor. This
advantage stems from their special experience and know-how in this particular industry. In this case
FDI investors outbid other investors for the top productivity ﬁrms.
Empirically, developing countries with weak ﬁnancial institutions, and low corporate governance and
accounting standards attract a higher share of their capital inﬂows in the form of FDI [see, for instance,
Loungani and Razin (2001)]. This ﬁnding is consistent with the main implication of our model. In a
similar vein, our model can explain two-way ﬂows of FDI among developed countries, as each country
can specialize and acquire better management standards in diﬀerent niches.
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